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Does the stock market gender stereotype corporate boards?  
Evidence from the market’s reaction to directors’ trades 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Attitudes towards male and female managers within organisations are well documented, but 
how the stock market perceives their relative capabilities is less studied. Recent evidence 
documents a negative short-run market reaction to the appointment of females CEOs and 
suggests that female executives are less informed about future corporate performance than 
their male counterparts. These results appear to dispute the stock market-value of having 
women on corporate boards. However, such short-run market reactions may retain a ‘gender 
bias’, reflecting the prevalence of negative stereotypes, where the market reacts to ‘beliefs’ 
rather than ‘performance’. We test for such bias by examining the stock market reaction to 
directors’ trades in their own companies’ shares, by measuring both the short-run and 
longer-term returns after the director’s trade. Allowing for firm and trade effects, we find 
some evidence that in the longer-term, markets recognise that female executives’ trades are 
informative about future corporate performance, although initially markets under-estimate 
these effects. This has important implications for those studies that have attempted to assess 
the value of board diversity by examining short-run stock market responses.  
 
 
 
Keywords:  Insiders, director-trades, gender, board-diversity, stereotypes. 
 
 
  
 3 
Does the stock market gender stereotype corporate boards?  
Evidence from the market’s reaction to directors’ trades 
 
 
An extensive literature exists attesting to the ‘glass ceiling’ that acts as a barrier to the 
progression of women to senior positions in organisations. Stereotyped and biased attitudes 
towards women are cited as one of the main explanations for the retention of these barriers 
(Everett et al., 1996; Valian, 1998).  Such negative attitudes and gender schema also explain 
the failure of the ‘pipeline’ argument which suggests that the comparatively low levels of 
female representation in senior positions merely reflects a time lapse between legislative or 
policy implementation and women progressing to the top of organisations rather than  
serving as a sign of intractable bias (Rhode, 2003). Crucially, the stereotyped attitudes are 
based on assumptions and perceptions rather than on any systematic review of actual 
behaviour and ability.  Unsurprisingly, if only small numbers of women are given the 
chance to reach higher levels in organisations then there are fewer opportunities for them to 
demonstrate their ability.  Consequently, studies on discrimination tend to focus on attitudes 
rather than seeking to contrast attitudes with evidence of performance.  This paper seeks to 
explore both the initial market reaction to trading activities of women on corporate boards 
and the longer term market reactions once evidence of their ability is apparent.  In doing so, 
we aim to demonstrate the ongoing bias reflected in attitudes towards women on corporate 
boards and present evidence that this bias is unfounded. 
 
Broadbridge and Simpson (2011) note that it is now well-recognised that biological sex and 
the social construction of gender are not equivalents, as is commonly demonstrated with 
reference to Simone de Beauvoir’s (1973[1949]) assertion that one is not born, but becomes 
a woman, and more recently through the work of West and Zimmerman (1987) and Butler 
(1989, 1993).  However, the close association of gender and sex and the normative demands 
of conforming to the sex-gender stereotype for social recognition means that both the female 
sex and feminine gender  are likely to be treated as if equivalents and equally face 
discrimination.  It is argued that women have to ‘manage like a man’ (Wajcman, 1998) to 
succeed.  This suggests a separation of sex and gender.  However their ‘token’ status (Kanter, 
1977) prevents them from being judged as an equal, even if conforming to a masculine ideal. 
 
One of the challenges faced when explaining the current state of sex (or gender) 
discrimination and low levels of female participation in senior positions is providing 
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evidence on systematic and widespread bias in decision-making.  Studies have either sought 
to provide accounts of the experience of discriminatory attitudes and glass ceiling barriers 
(Davies-Netzley, 1998; Ragins et al., 1998; Daily et al., 2000; Sheridan and Milgate, 2005; 
Castilla, 2008), or have explored reactions to women who have attained senior (board or 
CEO) levels (Wolfers, 2006).  In the former case, these accounts are often limited in their 
number of observations and can also suffer from respondents’ over- or under-representing 
their experiences as evidence of sex/gender discrimination.  In the latter case, the small 
numbers of women reaching these levels can make it difficult to achieve statistically 
significant results (Wolfers, 2006). 
 
There is a growing business case for diversity in board membership, and in particular gender 
diversity (typically used to mean sex diversity), due to tapping into broader talent pools 
(Singh et al., 2008; Terjesen et al., 2009), reflecting the diversity of the workforce and the 
product market (Brammer et al., 2009), and breaking out of the ‘old boys club’ and thus 
introducing a more independent perspective (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Terjesen et al., 
2009).   Policy documents in the UK (Davies, 2011; Higgs, 2003; Tyson, 2003) and in the 
US (NACD, 1998; Brancato and Patterson, 1999) have also argued that board diversity leads 
to a more effective board. In Norway (Randøy et al., 2006), Spain (Campbell and Minguez-
Vera, 2008), Belgium (Corporate Governance Committee, 2011) and France (Allen and 
Overy, 2011), regulators have gone as far as to impose compulsory or quasi-compulsory 
recommendations on female representation on boards.
1
   Yet the evidence drawn from a 
range of countries suggests that while representation of women at board level has increased, 
it remains low (Farrell and Hersch, 2005; Schein, 2007; Singh et al., 2008; Catalyst, 2009), 
especially when looking at the most senior level, such as that of the CEO (Wolfers, 2006).   
 
A compelling business case for gender diversity (Terjesen et al., 2009) would suggest a 
demand for women entering the boardroom. However the persistence of comparatively low 
levels of board level representation, and some evidence of higher numbers of women who 
hold multiple directorships, thereby implying a smaller ‘talent pool’ from which to select 
directors (Farrell and Hersch, 2005), suggests that some problems remain.  Davies (2011) 
recognises that these problems could be on the supply-side (not enough suitable candidates – 
                                                 
1
 Davies (2011)  lists a number of countries (Norway, Spain, Iceland, Finland, France, Netherlands, European 
Union)  that have implemented or are considering legislation for female quotas; and another list (US, Canada, 
Australia, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Poland) that are considering alternative actions to encourage 
female representation. 
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the pipeline case) or on the demand-side. To explore the demand-side, we must question the 
business case for diversity, and prevailing attitudes towards women at the board level, and in 
particular the persistence of gender stereotypes which may in turn inform the alleged supply-
side problems (where it is argued that women choose a different career path but may in fact 
be perceived to be less qualified and thus given less opportunities (Schein, 2007; Singh et 
al., 2008).  
 
A recent US-based study estimates that, at current trends, the number of women CEOs in the 
Fortune 1000 will be around 6% by 2016 (Helfat et al., 2006).  At such low levels it is 
unlikely that the problem is merely a supply side/pipeline problem.  As a consequence it is 
reasonable to hypothesise that boardrooms remain the preserve of men (Sheridan and 
Milgate, 2005), and that a ‘think manager – think male’ attitude prevails (Schein, 2007).  
Berthoin and Izraeli (1993) argued that the biggest barrier facing women was the gendered 
stereotype, a position supported more recently by the International Labour Organization 
(2004) and the Equal Opportunities Commission (2006).  Johnson and Powell (1994) 
suggested that women are excluded from managerial positions because of stereotypes 
formed on the basis of the non-managerial population. Schein (2007) also reports that 
attitudes of male managers remain largely unchanged from the 1970s, while women 
managers now perceive both men and women as possessing the necessary characteristics for 
success.  Despite these different attitudes, both men and women remain pessimistic about 
the likelihood of the effects of gender stereotyping changing in the foreseeable future 
(Wood, 2008).  
 
While much of the literature on stereotypes has focused on the effects of this bias within an 
organisational context, equally important is the wider stock market’s perception of women 
managers, their performance and contribution to the firm’s overall performance.  If it could 
be established that gender diversity is beneficial, or at least not detrimental to the firm’s 
performance and that markets perceive this to be the case, it may be possible to overcome 
some of the barriers to gender-equality of board membership. However, attempts to measure 
board performance and thus assess the value of board diversity
2
 remain problematic (Erhardt 
et al., 2003).  Consequently there are few systematic evaluations with most of the arguments 
in favour of diversity remaining intuitive or reputational rather than demonstrable (Brammer 
                                                 
2
 By board diversity we refer to categorical or demographic/observable forms of diversity, rather than 
cognitive/ unobservable forms of diversity (see Brammer et al., 2009). 
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et al., 2009).   Previous studies attempting to assess the value of gender diversity on boards 
have done so in relation to firm value and have provided conflicting results.
3
 The problem 
with such  an approach is that the market value of a company depends on many factors other 
than the gender composition of the board (Miller and Triana, 2009), and the statistical power 
of such tests is weak when the number of women represented in these positions are 
comparatively low (Wolfers, 2006). Furthermore the few women who achieve these 
positions are ascribed a token status given their numerical disadvantage (Kanter, 1997; 
Simpson, 1997) and often report having to ‘manage like a man’ to fit in (Davies-Netzley, 
1998; Schein, 2007).   
 
Kanter argued that a critical mass was required in order to affect the culture of a group; 
however this has been critiqued for being a gender-neutral theory that assumes numerical 
increases alone will improve the conditions for women within organisations, such as 
changing biased attitudes (Zimmer, 1988). Dobbin and Jung (2011) suggest that gender 
biases may exist even among institutional shareholders or the so called “smart money”. 
They investigate whether board diversity activates gender biases on the part of institutional 
shareholders by looking at its impact on stock price and firm performance. They find that 
while an increase in board diversity has no effect on profits, they have a negative effect on 
stock price which they attribute to non-block institutional investors selling stock of firms 
that appoint women to their boards.  Gender stereotypes, therefore, remain an important 
focus of study. 
 
Two recent papers (Lee and James, 2007; Bharath, Narayanan and Seyhun, 2009) propose a 
more targeted approach to identifying the role of gender, by adopting an event study 
procedure. The key difference with this research technique is not to link gender diversity 
directly to firm performance, but instead to consider the market’s reaction to actions that are 
related to the gender of the directors. This method examines whether stock markets react to 
the gender contingent signal in a manner that is consistent with gender diversity being 
beneficial.   Lee and James (2007) find that markets react more negatively to the 
appointment of female CEOs than male CEOs. They relate this negative stock market 
                                                 
3
Adams and Ferreira (2009),  Carter et al. (2003), Erhardt et al.  (2003),  Carter et al. (2008), Smith et al. 
(2006), Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008), and Francoeur, Labelle, and Sinclair-Desgagne (2008) all provide 
evidence of a positive effect of board diversity. Shrader et al. (1997) and Haslam et al. (2009) report a negative 
relationship; and Wolfers (2006) finds no differences in the stock market performance of female-headed versus 
male-headed S&P 500 companies. 
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response to Kanter’s (1977) token status theory, whereby the solo and outsider status of 
female executives attracts attention and scepticism on the part of investors, who rely on 
stereotypes of women to assess their leadership qualities
4
. Bharath et al. (2009) show that 
markets perceive  female insiders’ trades as being less informative of future corporate 
performance than male insiders’ trades and claim that this demonstrates that “female 
executives have a disadvantage relative to males in accessing inside information” (p. 1). 
 
One explanation for these results is the “glass cliff” argument, due to Ryan and Haslam 
(2005), that has been subject to recent debate (Adams, Gupta and Leeth, 2009; Ryan and 
Haslam, 2009; Haslam et al., 2010).  It is argued that females are appointed to boards of 
companies that are already in a precarious position (a ‘glass cliff’). In these circumstances it 
is not surprising that stock markets react relatively unfavourably to both female executive 
appointments and to trades of female insiders, since these events are occurring in distressed 
companies. An alternative explanation is that markets exhibit a gender bias in their short-
term reaction to events involving female executives.
 
However, if this alternative explanation 
holds, then we would expect these short-run inefficiencies to be corrected in the longer-term, 
assuming that costly discrimination would not persist at the expense of profit (Wolfers, 
2006). More generally, economists are becoming increasingly sceptical as to whether stock 
markets are informationally efficient, particularly in the short-term (Shiller, 2005). For 
example, the Turner Report (Financial Services Authority, 2009) into the causes of the 
financial markets crisis of 2007/08 blames regulators and policymakers for reliance on the 
presumption of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). Importantly, we would also expect 
any short-run inefficiencies to be corrected in the long-term. Indeed one of the arch-critics of 
the EMH (Shiller, 2003) argues that any market inefficiencies ultimately are corrected in the 
long-run when stock market bubbles burst and the market realigns to EMH values.  
 
In the context of biased reaction based on gender this means that any mis-pricing due to 
these gender biases will be corrected in the long-run, since initial investor scepticism as to 
the actions of female directors should wane as markets become fully informed about the 
consequences of these actions.  Differences between the short and long run responses 
                                                 
4
 There is evidence to suggest that women have to work harder than men on their profile to ‘reassure’ the board 
of their ability to perform (Sheridan and Milgate, 2005:852), with ‘name-brand’ female directors being 
favoured (Daily et al., 2000). Heilman et al. (2004) and Heilman and Okimoto (2007) find evidence from 
experimental studies that gender stereotypes prompt biases in evaluative judgements, even when women 
demonstrate their equal competence to men.  
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provide an insight into whether there is evidence to suggest that women are systematically 
initially undervalued by the stock market with reference to their senior position in the 
organisation.  In the rest of this paper we investigate gender differences in the patterns of 
and returns to directors’ trades in both the short-run and the long-run.  We argue that 
directors’ trades provide a more powerful test of market reaction to information related to 
board membership than studies which focus on the announcement of changes in boards, 
because they are far more numerous than directors’ appointments. Critically, examining both 
long-term and short-term market reaction allows us to compare short-run perceptions of how 
informed female directors are thought to be with longer horizon returns that provide us with 
an indication of how the market may have re-evaluated such initial perceptions when more 
information on performance became available. 
 
Corporate Boards and Directors’ trading 
Listed stock market companies are managed by a board of directors, whose executive and 
non-executive members are elected or appointed to oversee the activities of the company.
5
 
According to Davies (2011) board size ranges between 6 to 18 members, and Gregg, Jewell 
and Tonks (2011) find that median board size of FTSE350 companies over the period 1993-
2006 was 9 members. Although there was a subtle shift in the ratio of executives to non-
executives from 5:4 in 1993 to 4:5 in 2006, reflecting the impact of various corporate 
governance reports (Higgs, 2003). The UK’s corporate governance code (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2010; Paragraph B.1) recommends that for FTSE 350 companies, except 
for the chairperson, the majority of the board should comprise non-executive directors 
deemed to be independent of the company prior to appointment, where independence is 
defined by a set of criteria. The composition of corporate boards reflects a clear gender bias 
(Brancato and Patterson, 1999; Daily, Certo, and Dalton, 1999; Brammer et al., 2007). 
Davies (2011) reports that in 2010 the average percentage of women directors for FTSE 100 
and FTSE 250 companies was 12.5 and 7.8 per cent respectively, showing that women are 
under-represented. Similarly in the US, Bertrand and Hallock (2001) find that only 2.4% of 
the five most highly paid executive positions in S&P 500 firms were held by women. 
According to Catalyst Census (2009) women held 15.2 per cent of board seats of the Fortune 
500 companies, reflecting little growth over the previous five years. 
 
                                                 
5
 We use the UK definition of ‘directors’, meaning that we include all board members, incorporating both 
executive officers and non-executives, and we use the terms corporate insiders and directors interchangeably.   
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Subject to certain restrictions and disclosure requirements, corporate insiders (both 
executive and non-executive directors) may trade their own company stock.  So, provided 
directors do not violate insider trading restrictions, do not trade within periods when trades 
are restricted, and are not acting on price-sensitive information, directors of UK companies 
are allowed to trade in their companies’ securities with regulations requiring disclosure to be 
made within five days of the trade. Standard principal-agency theory applied to executive 
compensation recommends that managerial contracts include share incentives to align the 
interests of shareholders and managers (Murphy, 1999). Directors may legally sell shares for 
liquidity reasons, to diversify their accumulated holdings, or because they believe their 
company is over-valued. On the other hand, the typical reason for a director to buy their own 
company’s shares is when they believe that the stock market is undervaluing the firm’s 
assets, and that the long-term performance of their company is positive.
6
 It is the public 
disclosure of these own-share purchases that allows the stock market to infer that the 
director has information about future corporate performance. 
 
When considering an individual’s private trading decisions there are other factors extrinsic 
to the individual, such as stereotyping, old boys’ networks, and tokenism, that could affect 
both the actual and/or the perceived information gathering capability of the director, which 
is reflected in the returns to the directors’ trades. 7 Oakley (2000) notes that in the presence 
of skewed sex ratios there is a tendency for the dominant groups to exclude less-dominant 
groups. This would imply that given the small numbers of women on the board, female 
directors may be isolated, and may face discrimination in accessing information (Kramer et 
al., 2007).
8
  
 
The evidence on corporate insider trading supports the conjecture that the stock market 
correctly infers from the directors’ trading actions that the director has information about 
whether the current share price over- or under-values the future value of the company.  
Seyhun (1986), Jeng et al. (2003), Friederich et al. (2002), and Fidrmuc et al. (2006) all find 
                                                 
6
 Although there may be an expectation that directors hold at least a modest stake in their own companies. 
7
 Other factors like attitudes to risk taking, ethics, and overconfidence may affect both market timing and the 
post trade returns. While we do not explicitly test for this, unreported results from a Fisher’s exact test show 
that in general, there is no significant difference in the likelihood of trading between male directors and female 
directors, in firms for which the required data (proportion of male and female directors in the population) is 
available (only FTSE 100 firms).  
8
 Hoogendoorn et al. (2011) show using a group of undergraduate student subjects in an experimental setting 
that gender-mixed teams perform better than single-sex teams for both males and females. 
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that trades by corporate insiders in UK and US companies generate short-run abnormal 
returns. Further, studies of the long-run market reaction to directors’ trades strengthen these 
short-run results (Gregory, Matatko and Tonks, 1997; Lakoniskok and Lee, 2001) with 
abnormal returns persisting for up to three years after the initial trade.  However Bharath et 
al. (2009) show, using a sample of US insider trades from 1975-2008, that the short-run 
stock price reaction around male trades exhibit significantly greater returns than for female 
insider trades, regardless of their position in the organisation. They view their results as 
supporting an information access hypothesis, with the controversial implication that male 
executives have better access to information than female executives.   
 
We believe that this contentious finding warrants a careful investigation in an alternative 
empirical stock market setting (the UK as opposed to the US) particularly as they look only 
at short run returns.  If the market perceives female managers as being less skilled and 
knowledgeable about the firm’s affairs, irrespective of their actual capability, the market will 
not consider female director trades as information revealing events, and stock price in the 
short-run reaction will be muted.  However, if these short-term market reactions are based 
on a biased view of the knowledge or skill of female directors such effects will reverse in the 
longer term. By comparing the results for long-run with the short-run returns by gender, we 
may identify whether the stock market mistakenly inferred the information content of female 
directors’ trades, due to tokenism or stereotyping. A potential complication is that Seyhun 
(1986) identifies an information hierarchy effect whereby directors who are more senior 
within a company in terms of their role and responsibilities have access to more valuable 
information, and we would expect such directors to trade more profitably.  Hence, in 
examining gender differences in directors’ trading, we also condition on the role of the 
director in the company, and in particular whether the director has an executive or non-
executive position. 
Data  
The data on directors’ (both executive and non-executive) dealings and directors’ 
shareholdings for the period 1
st
 January 1994 to 30
th
 September 2006 for UK companies 
listed on the London Stock Exchange is sourced from the Hemscott directors’ trading 
database. The source dataset contains 374,145 entries pertaining to corporate insider trades 
(including large shareholders) in 4,412 different firms, and covers all companies that have 
entered or exited since January 1994, and consequently avoids any survivorship biases. We 
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filter this dataset by only considering the constituents of the FTSE All Share Index and the 
companies listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), and we only consider open 
market purchases and sales of ordinary shares by directors. To identify the directors’ gender 
we use the Price Waterhouse Coopers CD register and the Corporate Register (various 
issues). Where information was available, we also cross checked our data for FTSE 350 
companies with the female FTSE index reports published by the Centre for Women 
Business Leaders, Cranfield University. Daily returns, the daily market capitalisations for 
the event firms, and the benchmark FTSE All Share Index returns are sourced from 
Datastream.  
 
After the dataset is cleaned of  duplicate, inaccurate or incomplete transactions, missing 
announcement dates and transactions dates,  there are 80,930 trades by directors over the 
sample period, composed of  62,106 purchases and 18,824 sales by 15,357 (split 
between14,747 males and 610 females) and 6,689 (split between 6517 males and 172 
females) directors respectively. In our analysis we generate trading signals from these 
individual trades. In generating the trading signals for our tests (described below) we take 
into account multiple and possibly conflicting signals when more than one director trades on 
the same day in the same firm. When we condition on gender and role, we work with two 
subsets of the data. The first subset (sub-sample 1) conditions on gender, and is obtained by 
partitioning the raw dataset by gender of the director who is trading, after eliminating trades 
by directors of the both genders on the same day and aggregating the purchases and sales by 
gender and define the trading signal based on the net number of shares bought or sold: a buy 
signal results from positive net trades, and a sell signal from negative net trades. This leaves 
us with 36,129 purchase signals (split between 35,145 signals by males and 983 signals by 
females) and 10975 sell signals (split between 10,817signals by males and 158 signals by 
females) 
 
Our second dataset (sub-sample 2) is a double sort that first sorts by director role and then 
sorts again by gender.  We again eliminate transactions where any two directors with 
different roles or different genders have traded on the same day, and then aggregate the 
remaining purchases and sales to obtain the daily buy and sell signals. This leaves us with 
15,565 male-executive purchase signals, 16,579 male non-executive purchase signals, 359 
female executive purchase signals, 622 female non-executive purchase signals, 6,578 male 
executive sell signals, 3,357 non-executive male sell signals,   110 female executive sell 
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signals and 48 female non-executive sell signals. Summary statistics on the characteristics of 
sub-sample 1 and sub-sample 2 are provided in Table 1. 
 
All of the panels show that for the aggregated data, the number of buy signals is greater than 
the number of sell signals. However, the mean and the median value of shares traded are 
larger for sell transactions. We report tests for differences in mean values and a Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test of each variable between males and females. On average the value of male 
directors’ trades purchased is significantly larger than that for female directors, in both mean 
and median terms (Table 1, Panel A), although the significance is less pronounced in the 
case of sale trades.  Panel A clearly shows that female directors are trading in larger firms, 
on average, on the buy side although there are no significant differences on the sell side.  
However, female trades are a bigger percentage of their initial holdings, both on the buy and 
sell sides.   
 
When we turn to sub-sample 2, partitioned on the basis of gender and role (Table 1, Panel B), 
we see that the difference between male and female buy trades carries through to both 
executive and non-executive directors’ categories in respect of both trade value and the 
percentage of holdings traded.  In both groups, females trade a higher proportion of their 
initial holdings.  However, the finding that females buy in larger firms on average is driven 
by the group of non-executive directors.  On the sell side, differences are generally less 
significant, although we again see females tend to trade a larger percentage of their holdings, 
whether they are executives or non-executives. 
 
Research Methods 
To investigate the short run abnormal returns around directors’ purchase signals, we apply 
an event study methodology based on a standard market model benchmark, with the market 
return (Rmt) being the FT All-Share Index.
 9
  Specifically, the market model calculates the 
abnormal return, ARit for firm i on day t as: 
 mtiiitit RRAR  ˆˆ   
                                                 
9
 We also run the event study using a market adjusted returns model and also using Buy-and-Hold abnormal 
returns (BHAR) as a robustness check. The market adjusted returns model calculates the abnormal returns as
mtRitRitAR  . Unreported results show that our conclusions are robust to these alternative methodologies. 
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Where Rit is the firm i return on day t, and iˆ and iˆ  are firm-specific regression parameters 
estimated over the 250 day period event day -310 to event day -61.  For each event day, 
abnormal returns are aggregated across event firms to give average abnormal returns (AARs) 
and accumulated over various windows of interest to give cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAARs).  We focus on various CAAR windows for up to 60 days after the directors’ 
trade. The event day is designated as the announcement date of the directors’ trade. We use a 
standardized cross-sectional t-test which is robust to the problem of misspecification due to 
event-induced variance changes, developed by Boehmer et al. (1991) to test for the 
significance of the AARs and the CAARs. We also confirm the robustness of our results 
using the Corrado rank-sum test (Corrado, 1989) which is robust to non-normal distributions, 
cross sectional dependence, thin trading, serial dependence in abnormal returns and 
overlapping sample periods as demonstrated by Campbell and Wesley (1993).   
 
We undertake two tests.  First, we make simple comparisons of the post-trade CAARs 
across classes of director.  However, event studies are univariate studies and it is possible 
that the characteristics of firms that employ female directors may well differ from those that 
do not and these need to be controlled for.  Furthermore, there may be wealth effects that 
have an important role to play in explaining the returns to the trades.  For example, we 
would need to control for the value of any transactions and directors prior holdings whilst 
assessing the impact of gender and role differences. Also, multiple trades on the same day 
may have more information content than single trades. To cope with these effects, our 
second test controls for firm size and trade characteristics and allows for other firm specific 
differences by employing a firm fixed-effects regression framework.
 10
 This should 
accommodate any unobservable firm-specific characteristics which might differ between 
firms which have male and female directors. In our regressions we include control variables 
such as the log of a firm’s market capitalization, the value of the transaction, the trade as a 
percentage of the prior holding of the director, and a dummy variable for multiple trades.  
Dummy variables are then used to identify trades by male non-executives, female executives 
and female non-executives, with male executives forming the base category.    
 
                                                 
10
 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out, and suggesting a fixed effects approach as 
the solution.  
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The long-run post-purchase returns are examined at horizons of 3, 6, 9 and 12 months 
following the trading signal. Following the recent literature on the measurement of long run 
returns we use a calendar time abnormal returns (CTAR) method. We control for the well 
documented size and value effects (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Gregory, Tharyan and Tonks, 
2011) by using a survivorship-bias free set of Fama-French factors for the UK constructed 
by Gregory, Tharyan and Huang (2009)
11
.  The calendar time abnormal returns reported are 
monthly estimates, and include the month of the trade itself.  Estimates of calendar time 
abnormal returns are established in the conventional manner by regressing the return on the 
calendar time portfolio of directors’ trades in the previous N months on the Fama-French 
plus momentum factors, also called the Carhart model.
12
  To allow for the possibility of 
heteroscedasticity in the calendar time portfolios, all standard errors are White (1980) 
heteroscedasticity-consistent estimates.  We also employ a 60 day market model CAAR as a 
test of “longer” term reaction, which enables us to employ the fixed-effects regression 
framework described above.
13
   
 
When testing abnormal returns, we find that returns following sell trades tend towards 
insignificance, a result that has been documented by other studies.  In general, this effect 
would be expected if sales took place for liquidity reasons.  In addition Korczak, Korczak 
and Lasfer (2010) argue that insider selling before bad news induces regulatory attention and 
litigation risk, and rational insiders anticipating these risks will be less likely to trade over-
valued securities. Given this general insignificance, we drop sales transactions from the 
subsequent analysis, and concentrate on directors’ purchases. The premise is that directors 
with private information about future corporate performance will purchase shares if they 
estimate that the current share price under-estimates future firm value. 
Results 
Short-run Market Reaction following Directors’ Trades 
In Table 2 we report the short-run CAARs following directors’ trades. Panel A reports that 
20 days after a directors’ purchase of shares a company’s stock price rises on average by 
1.55%. Based on the gender of the director, we find that for male director buy trades the 
                                                 
11
 The factors are freely available at http://xfi.exeter.ac.uk/researchandpublications/portfoliosandfactors/index 
12
 An alternative using only the three Fama-French factors gives similar conclusions, although CTARs tended 
to be smaller in magnitude. 
13
 At which point a calendar-time model should be preferred to a CAAR model is moot.  Critically, CTARs 
have the advantage of being cross-sectionally independent, which CAARs are not.  Our Corrado rank-sum tests 
deal with this problem in the case of the CAARs. 
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CAARs are significantly positive for all windows: +0.86% on announcement, 1.22% 
between days 1 to 10, and 1.57% after 20 days. In contrast the market’s reaction to female 
trades are smaller.  For female director buy trades the CAARs are a significant +0.88% for 
the (1, 20) window and +0.53% for the (1, 10) window, and there is an abnormal return of 
+0.59% on the announcement day.  These results seem to suggest that the price reaction to 
male directors’ buy trades is faster and larger than that for female directors’. The t-test and 
rank test confirms that there is a significant difference between the genders in the returns of 
buy trades for all the event windows.  
[Table 2 about here] 
 
In order to separate out the role and gender effects in the post-trade short-run event study, 
we now report the results after a two-way partitioning of the dataset using sub-sample 2. 
These results are presented in Panel B of Table 2. Male executive and male non-executive 
directors’ buy transactions show significant positive abnormal returns for all windows. The 
female executive directors’ transactions show significant abnormal returns for the (1, 10) 
period of +1.26%, and for the (1, 20) period of +1.54%, although these numbers are smaller 
than the stock price reaction to their counterpart male executive trades. Panel C shows that 
the abnormal returns to the female executive buy trades are not statistically significantly 
different from the stock market response to the male executive buy trades. For the female 
non-executives again we find small positive abnormal returns for all windows but these are 
generally insignificant, apart from the announcement day return which is 0.44%.  We find 
significant differences between the returns of non-executive male and female directors at the 
(1, 10) and the (1, 20) horizons, although the latter are only significant at the 10% level.  
 
In Table 3 we report the results from the firm fixed effects regression controlling for firm 
size, trade related characteristics and other unobservable firm level differences. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
The results are quite striking.  For the short event windows we see that firm size, trade value, 
trade as a percentage of prior holding and multiple trading are all significant explanatory 
variables and shows the expected sign. For the CAARs up to 10 days, none of the 
gender/role categories appears to be important.  However, as we move through to the 20 and 
60 day CAAR windows, trades by female executives start to assume positive significance, 
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over and above the abnormal returns to male executives.  These results overturn the 
univariate statistics in Table 2  and lead us to question the conclusions of Bharath et al. 
(2009) that female executives are informationally disadvantaged. After 60 days, CAARs are 
a significant 2.84% greater following a trade by a female executive than that observed when 
a male executive trades. These findings emphasise that the conditioning variables in the 
panel regression are important determinants of the stock price reaction to insider trades. For 
example we obtain a negative coefficient on the firm market-cap variable in Table 3, but 
females are more likely to occupy board positions in larger than smaller firms (Davies, 
2011),
 14
 and Friederich et al. (2002) show that abnormal returns to insider trading is more 
pronounced in smaller firms. In which case the attenuated stock market reaction to female 
trades in the univariate results in Table 2 can be explained by women being under-
represented in smaller firms. We next look to see if these effects carry through to the longer 
term. 
 
Long-run returns following Directors’ Trades 
We analyse abnormal returns for horizons of up to 24 months post-trade to see whether male 
directors trade more profitably than females in the long-run.  
 
     [Table 4 about here]  
 
The results we report in Table 4 are limited up to the 12-month horizon as returns beyond 12 
months for all categories of buy trade are not significant.
15
  Table 4 Panel A shows the effect 
of partitioning on gender separately, and the results at three, six, nine and twelve months are 
reported.  Partitioning on the basis of male/female, we see that at every horizon female 
trades exhibit slightly higher returns than their male counter parts.  Male directors’ trades 
earn 0.43%, 0.37%, 0.34%, and 0.33% per month at three, six, nine and twelve months 
horizons, whereas the female directors’ trades earn 0.55%, 0.51%, 0.46% and 0.44% per 
month respectively.  The differences between males and females are not significant. 
 
                                                 
14
 Davies (2011) reports that women comprise 12.5% of directorships of large FTSE100 companies, but only 
7.8% of the boards of smaller FTSE250 companies. 
15
 Note that this is consistent with the finding in Gregory, Tharyan and Tonks (2009) that any longer term 
abnormal returns are concentrated in smaller stocks and small value stocks in particular.  Furthermore, the 
highest annualized returns to such trades are found at the 6 month horizon. 
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In Panel B of Table 4, we partition returns both by gender and by executive versus non-
executive categories.  Whilst male executives earn 0.50%, 0.41%, 0.38% and 0.37% per 
month at the three, six, nine and twelve months horizons respectively, the female executives 
earn 0.80%, 0.70%, 0.68% and 0.68% per month respectively.  In other words, in the long 
term female executive trades earn larger abnormal returns that their male counter-parts do.  
All of these returns are statistically significant, at the 1% level.  However, the formal tests 
for differences reveal that none of these is actually significant at conventional levels, 
although the 12-month differences is close to being significant at the 10% level.  When it 
comes to the non-executives, male non-executives earn significant abnormal returns of 
0.39%, 0.35%, 0.31% and 0.31% per month at the three, six, nine and twelve month 
horizons, all of them significant at conventional levels.  Female non-executive returns are 
generally similar, with the returns being 0.32%, 0.43%, 0.32% and 0.26% respectively, and 
all but the 3 month abnormal return is significant.  Once again, none of the differences are 
significant.   
 
In all, these results seem consistent with those in Table 3. Whilst CTARs have the statistical 
advantages explained above, they are somewhat imprecise estimates and do not lend 
themselves to testing in a fixed-effects regression framework.  Nonetheless, the implications 
seem clear.  The presence of abnormal returns beyond the event window suggest first that 
markets under-react to the information conveyed by directors’ trades at the time of 
announcement, and that this under-reaction seems most marked in the case of female 
executives.   
Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper has examined gender differences in the market reaction immediately following 
the announcement of directors’ trades, and whether these differences persist in the long-term. 
In all cases we controlled for whether the director occupied an executive or non-executive 
position. Our findings from a univariate event study methodology show that on 
announcement of the trades, markets react less favourably to trades by female directors.  In 
this respect our UK results are partially consistent with Bharath et al. (2009), however their 
conclusion that women are informationally disadvantaged is not warranted for the UK 
sample.  After controlling for firm and trade related characteristics, we find that returns to 
female executive trades are in fact significantly greater than the returns to male executive 
trades if we consider returns 10 days or more post-trade. The need to control for firm and 
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trade characteristics in interpreting stock market reactions responds to the need to consider 
particular contextual factors that influence reactions to trading behaviour, including the 
‘glass-cliff’ arguments suggesting that women tend to be appointed to senior positions in 
distressed companies (Haslam et al., 2010). These selection effects need to be allowed for in 
assessing how the stock market values gender diversity. 
 
Further, our results show that relying on only the announcement period or the very short-run 
post event returns may give rise to a very different conclusion from that arrived at by 
observing longer period returns
16
.  In relation to directors’ trades, we argue that the 
announcement period market reaction does not reflect the actual information gathering 
capabilities of female directors but reveals only the market’s perception of such capabilities, 
which may have less to do with their actual capabilities and more to do with gender 
stereotyping.   
 
In this context, our short-run results are consistent with the sex-role stereotyping hypotheses 
of Lee and James (2007).  However, if short-term market reactions are influenced by sex-
role stereotyping, then we would expect this less favourable reaction to be mitigated once 
markets have more information.  That is precisely what we find with regard to directors’ 
trades.  In the long term, from three months to up to a year after the trade, there is no 
substantive difference in the market reaction to male and female directors’ trades.  Indeed, 
overall female trades appear to be marginally more informative than male trades, although 
this effect is concentrated in the female executive group. Our study helps to explain the 
seemingly contradictory findings of Wolfers (2006), who concludes that it is not possible to 
reject the thesis that the long-run returns of male and female-headed firms are the same, and 
that of Lee and James (2007), who find negative announcement effects to female board 
appointments. 
 
While demonstrating an economic basis for supporting the case for board diversity in that 
females appear to have the same information and capacity to use this information as their 
male counterparts, this paper also indicates the possibility of gendered stereotypes as the 
market initially undervalues the informative value of female trades.  The market 
demonstrates the intractable nature of gender/sex discrimination in the boardroom and 
                                                 
16
 This observation is also valid for the market reaction to many corporate events. For example, there is 
evidence from mergers and acquisition literature that announcement period returns may be poor predictors of 
long run outcomes (Schoenberg, 2006; Papadakis and Thanos, 2009).   
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beyond, and the role of gendered stereotypes that exist beyond the organisational boundaries 
in maintaining stereotypes within the organisation (Fortin, 2005).  Following Wolfers (2006: 
p. 532) we agree that using financial data can offer useful insights into discrimination and 
“the persistence of biased beliefs about ability” with the advantage that the data is not 
affected by the need to disentangle the varied nature of individual accounts of discrimination.  
 
We tend to agree with Haslam et al. (2010, p. 495) that “clarifying the ongoing and long-
term relationship between market reactions and the realities to which they relate also 
emerges as an important project for further research and one that is likely to have a number 
of important practical implications”.  At the heart of this statement is the need to locate 
discriminatory practices in the broader societal context in which they occur of which the 
market plays a central role (Fortin, 2005).  With this in mind, we believe our work not only 
has important implications for understanding market reactions to executive appointments 
and the valuation of firms with female directors, but also contributes to the body of work 
that assesses the prevalence of sex-role/gender stereotypes. The findings of a negative 
market reaction to the inclusion of females on boards pose a challenge for those who 
advocate the beneficial effects of gender diversity in top management teams.  However, the 
evidence from our study demonstrates that such a reaction may be based on perceptions 
rather than any real differences in ability. One limitation of our study, however, is that while 
the long-run calendar-time methodology has the statistical power to detect abnormal returns, 
these estimates do not allow for analysis of long-term abnormal returns within a fixed-
effects regression framework. A promising avenue for future work would be to re-examine 
the evidence on executive appointments by considering the long run returns post-
appointments, after controlling for firm characteristics. 
 
It may be the case that “as women executives becomes less unique, there will be less 
difference in the reaction to the announcement of male appointments and female 
appointments” Lee and James (2007; p. 239), which suggests that gender stereotyping of 
boards might weaken with increased numbers of women directors (Kanter, 1977). However, 
the problem is that if firms and policy makers believe in such short term reactions as 
indicative of the markets’ beliefs that having women directors on boards does not increase 
value or is even detrimental to firm value then this would be a major problem for increased 
gender diversity on boards. Since boards are sensitive to the impact of their actions on stock 
price (Khurana,2002), the danger is that they may mistakenly believe that pursuing a gender 
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diversity agenda might be perceived by the market as moving away from a value orientation 
to a political orientation (Dobbin and Jung, 2011).  Focusing on sex/ gender diversity as the 
‘right’ thing to do diverts attention from the (market) value of having women in executive 
positions. This doesn’t negate the moral arguments for diversity on boards (understanding 
value in broader terms) but supplements it. Indeed, as Terjesen et al., (2009) note, women 
directors may also add to value in many qualitative ways which may not be reflected in pure 
accounting metrics. However, recognising the value of women in economic terms makes it 
clear that seeking board diversity is not a cost to the firm, and is entirely consistent with 
maximisation of long-term shareholder value. 
 
However, the challenges faced in over-turning biased attitudes are unlikely to be achieved 
simply by reaching a critical mass of women who are performing well (and recognised as 
such). More research evidence is required in addressing the structural nature of gender 
discrimination within the organisation and beyond. In terms of future research, another line 
of inquiry would be to examine whether the under-reaction to women directors’ trades in the 
short-run is affected by the number of women on the board of directors. We might anticipate 
that those cases where the board of directors has several women directors, who have been 
able to demonstrate their abilities would generate an initial stock market reaction that is 
unaffected by tokenism. In any case, it important that studies using market reaction to events 
involving female executives should consider the long term effects. Only more extensive 
reporting of this kind of evidence that incorporates long term measures would serve to 
destabilise any stereotypical and entrenched views.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Aggregated Daily Trading Signals 
 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics on the two sub-samples of data constructed from the raw 
data after aggregating individual directors’ daily trades to obtain aggregate daily trading signals for 
any company by gender (sub-sample 1) and by role and gender (sub-sample 2). Number of Daily 
Signals is the number of aggregated daily director trading signals in a company by trade type (buy 
and sell); and for all directors, and by gender; Market Value of Firms is the market capitalization of 
the companies in which these directors are trading; Value of Shares Traded is the market value of the 
shares traded by the director; % Holdings Traded is the number of shares traded by the director as a 
percentage of the shares held by that director; Trade Value as % of Market Cap is the value of shares 
traded by the director as a percentage of the market capitalization of  the company. ME=Male 
Executive, MNE=Male Non-Executive, FE=Female Executive, FNE=Female Non-Executive. 
 
 Panel A:    Buy Samples   Sell Samples   
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Sub-sample 1 
  All Dir Male 
 
Female 
 
t-test 
p-
value 
Rank
-sum 
test 
p-
value 
All dir Male 
 
Female 
 
t-test 
p-
value 
Rank
-sum 
test 
p-
value 
Number of 
Daily Signals 
  36,129 35,146 983 10,975 10,817 158 
Market Value  
of firms  
(£ million): 
Mean 1,918 1,872 3,580 <.01 <.01 1,746 1,754 1,189 0.37 0.31 
Median 108 104 278 158 158 140 
Value of 
Shares 
Traded (£): 
Mean 49,425 77,209 27,538 0.05 <.01 566,472 909,560 303,730 0.28 <.01 
Median 8,505 10,530 6,650 42,165 63,000 28,882 
% Holdings 
Traded: 
Mean 29.87 29.33 49.16 <.01 <.01 20.00 20.00 27.00 <.01 <.01 
Median 11.83 16.86 42.10 9.00 9.00 13.00 
Trade Value 
as % of 
Market Cap: 
Mean 0.19 0.20 0.06 0.22 <.01 0.76 0.76 0.39 0.81 0.07 
Median 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.03 
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Panel B: Sub-sample 2 Buy Samples  
   ME FE t-test 
p-value 
Rank-
sum 
test 
p-value 
MNE FNE t-test 
p-value 
Rank-
sum 
test 
p-value 
Number of 
Signals: 
 15,565 359 16,579 622 
Market Value  of 
firms 
(£ million): 
Mean 2,478 2,047 0.49 <.01 1,402 4,442 <.01 <.01 
Median 111 207 108 388 
Value of Shares 
Traded (£): 
 
Mean 61,423 15,542 <.01 <.01 73,863 34,542 0.32 <.01 
Median 9,750 3,000 10,046 7,925 
% Holdings 
Traded: 
 
Mean 23.37 27.11 0.03 0.027 36.98 62.05 <.01 <.01 
Median 6.02 5.28 21.47 67.82 
Trade Value as 
% of Market 
Cap: 
 
Mean 0.15 0.04 0.09 <.01 0.16 0.07 0.22 
  
<.01 
Median 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Sub-sample 2 
  
Sell Samples 
   ME FE t-test 
p-
value 
 
Rank-
sum 
test 
p-
value 
MNE FNE t-test 
p-
value 
Rank-
sum 
test 
p-value 
Number of Signals:  6,578 110 3,375 48 
Market Value  of firms  
(£ million): 
Mean 2,171 740 <.01 0.02 1,166 2,219 0.26 0.19 
Median 179 121 130 214 
Value of Shares Traded 
(£): 
 
Mean 600,820 334,430 0.30 0.08 834,820 233,360 0.39 <.01 
Median 55,426 39,150 58,500 19,805 
% Holdings Traded: 
 
Mean 19.25 24.75 0.02 0.04 23.57 30.37 <.01 0.14 
Median 8.97 10.69 10.61 19.80 
Trade Value as % of 
Market Cap: 
  
Mean 0.48 0.51 0.94 0.57 0.54 0.12 0.16 <.01 
Median 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.01 
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Table 2: Post-trade Short-run Abnormal Returns by Gender and Role 
 
Table 2 reports the results of the event studies for various post-event windows. Panel A reports the 
results for all directors and sorted by gender (Sub-sample 1). In panel A, F=Female and M=Male. 
Panel B reports the results of a double sort by director role and director gender (Sub-sample 2). Panel 
C reports the results of the pairwise test for difference in CAARS between the various subgroups. 
The t and z are the statistics from a t-test and a Wilcoxon rank-sum test respectively. In Panel C, 
ME=Male Executive, MNE=Male Non-Executive, FE=Female Executive, FNE=Female Non-
Executive. Individual t-statistics are not reported. The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent significance levels, respectively, using a two-
tailed test. 
 
 
Panel A: All directors and by gender 
 
Market Model Buy 
Director Group (1,20) (1,10) (0,1) 
All Directors 1.55%*** 1.20%*** 0.85%*** 
Male 1.57%*** 1.22%*** 0.86%*** 
Female 0.88%*** 0.53%** 0.59%*** 
t-test for diff  (M-F) 2.28** 3.26***  2.44*** 
Rank-sum test  for diff  (M-F) 2.26** 2.96***  2.37*** 
 
 
Panel B: Directors by gender and role 
 
Market Model Buy 
Director Group (1,20) (1,10) (0,1) 
ME 1.72%*** 1.32%*** 0.92%*** 
MNE 1.22%*** 0.94%*** 0.65%*** 
FE 1.54%*** 1.26%*** 0.87%*** 
FNE   0.52% 0.11% 0.44%*** 
 
 
Panel C: Differences by gender controlling for role 
 
Market Model Buy 
Director Group (1,20) (1,10) (0,1) 
 t z t z t z 
ME-FE 0.35 0.5 0.17 0.26 1.26 0.73 
MNE-FNE 1.86* 1.83* 3.24*** 2.89*** 1.24 1.29 
 
 
 29 
Table 3: Fixed-effect regression tests of short run post-trade returns 
 
Table 3 reports the results of a firm fixed-effects regression with, respectively, 1 day, 10 day, 20 day 
and 60 day CAARs as dependent variables.  Independent variables are the log of the firms’ market 
capitalisation (Mcap), the log of the value of the directors’ trade (Value), the log of 1 plus the pre-
trade holding (%holding), a dummy variable for multiple trades on the same day (Multiple) and 
dummy variables for Male Non-Executives (MNEs), Female Executives (FEs) and Female Non-
Executives (FNEs). Male executives’ trades form the base case.  The symbols *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent significance levels, respectively, 
using a two-tailed test, with t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
 
 Variables Dep. Var 1-day 
CAAR 
Dep. Var 10-day 
CAAR 
 
Dep. Var 20-day 
CAAR 
 
Dep. Var 60-day 
CAAR 
 
Mcap 
 
-0.0048*** 
-(10.65) 
-0.0254*** 
-(28.57) 
-0.0458*** 
-(37.81) 
-0.1152*** 
-(51.17) 
Value 0.0015*** 
(9.22) 
0.0033*** 
(10.36) 
0.0034*** 
(7.87) 
0.0028*** 
(3.51) 
%holding 
 
0.0021*** 
(4.41) 
0.0023** 
(2.42) 
0.0025* 
(1.88) 
0.0009 
(0.37) 
Multiple 
 
0.0016*** 
(2.92) 
0.0026** 
(2.35) 
0.0046*** 
(2.99) 
0.0046 
(1.61) 
MNE 
 
-0.0010 
-(1.65) 
-0.0005 
-(0.47) 
0.0007 
(0.44) 
0.0034 
(1.14) 
FE 
 
0.0003 
(0.10) 
0.0123** 
(2.21) 
0.0177** 
(2.33) 
0.0284** 
(2.02) 
FNE 
 
0.0007 
(0.31) 
-0.0055 
-(1.16) 
0.0047 
(0.73) 
0.0190 
(1.58) 
Constant 
 
0.0180*** 
(7.16) 
0.1100*** 
(22.03) 
0.2110*** 
(30.98) 
0.5589*** 
(44.18) 
R
2
 0.0376 0.0322 0.0305 0.0247 
Prob F <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01 
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Table 4: Post-trade Long-run Calendar-time Abnormal Returns by Gender and Role 
 
Table 4 reports the results of the Calendar Time Portfolio regressions using the Carhart Four Factor 
model for holding periods of 3 months, 6 months, 9 months, and 12 months. The ARs are intercepts 
from a four-factor regression of the calendar time portfolio on a market factor, a size factor, a book-
to-market factor, and a momentum factor and represents the average monthly abnormal return.  Panel 
A reports the results for all directors and sorted by gender (Sub-sample 1). Panel B reports the results 
of a double sort by director role and director gender (Sub-sample 2). The t-statistic is 
heteroskedasticity corrected using White’s procedure; E=Executive, N=Non-Executive, M=Male, 
F=Female, ME=Male Executive, FE=Female Executive, MNE=Male Non-Executive, FNE=Female 
Non-Executive. Individual t-statistics are reported underneath the abnormal returns. The symbols *, 
** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, with t-
statistics in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: Buy Trades by Gender 
Director Group 3-month AR 6-month AR 9-month AR 12-month AR 
Male 0.0043*** 
( 4.29) 
0.0037*** 
( 4.01) 
0.0034*** 
( 3.79) 
0.0033*** 
( 3.69) 
Female 0.0055*** 
(2.66) 
0.0051*** 
( 3.42) 
0.0046*** 
( 3.32) 
0.0044*** 
( 3.23) 
M-F -0.0012 
(-0.65) 
-0.0014 
(-0.85) 
-0.0012 
(-0.87) 
-0.0011 
(-0.81) 
 
Panel B: Buy Trades by Gender and Role 
Director Group 3-month AR 6-month AR 9-month AR 12-month AR 
ME 0.005*** 
(4.17) 
0.0041*** 
(3.67 ) 
0.0038*** 
( 3.62) 
0.0037*** 
(3.48) 
FE 
 
0.008*** 
(2.37) 
0.007*** 
(2.56) 
0.0068*** 
(2.67) 
0.0068*** 
(2.80) 
ME-FE 
 
-0.003 
(-1.04) 
-0.0029 
(-1.24) 
-0.003 
(-1.47) 
-0.0031 
(-1.61) 
MNE 0.0039*** 
(3.91) 
0.0035*** 
(3.85) 
0.0031*** 
(3.54) 
0.0031*** 
(3.60) 
FNE 
 
0.0032 
(1.21) 
0.0043** 
(2.27) 
0.0032** 
(1.90) 
0.0026** 
(1.76) 
MNE-FNE 0.0007 
(0.25) 
-0.0008 
(-0.4) 
-0.0001 
(-0.05) 
0.0005 
(0.31) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
